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Abstract 
Bacteria produce a great diversity of siderophores to scavenge for iron in their environment. 
We suggest that this diversity results from the interplay between siderophore producers 
(cooperators) and non-producers (cheaters): when there are many cheaters exploiting a 
siderophore type it is beneﬁcial for a mutant to produce a siderophore unusable by the 
dominant population. We formulated and analysed a mathematical model for tagged public 
goods to investigate the potential for the emergence of diversity. We found that, although 
they are rare most of the time, cheaters play a key role in maintaining diversity by 
regulating the different populations of cooperators. This threshold-triggered feedback 
prevents any stain of cooperators from dominating the others. Our study provides a novel 
general mechanism for the evolution of diversity that may apply to many forms of social 
behaviour. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Bacteria require iron for survival and growth and have evolved a variety of mechanisms to 
scavenge for the insoluble form Fe3+. One such mechanism is the production of 
siderophores, which are molecules that bind (chelate, in chemical terms) iron with a high 
afﬁnity (Guerinot 1994). Siderophores are diverse (more than 500 different siderophores are 
known; Ratledge & Dover 2000; Wandersman & Delepelaire 2004), but all have essentially 
the same structure, consisting of a functional unit that ligates with iron molecules 
(transferrins, lactoferrins) and a peptide backbone interacting with a receptor on the surface 
membrane of the bacteria. An important property of siderophores is their speciﬁcity: the 
siderophore receptor of a bacterium can generally only recognise the peptidic chain of a 
single siderophore (Hohnadel & Meyer 1988; Cornelis et al. 1989; de Chial et al. 2003; 
Spencer et al. 2003), although some strains can recognise multiple siderophore types by 
expressing different receptors (Barelmann et al. 2002; Ghysels et al. 2004). 
How siderophore diversity has emerged and why it persists is not completely understood. 
Here, we will investigate this question focusing on Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa produces several types of siderophores, the main class of which are called 
pyoverdines (Cornelis & Matthijs 2002). Of these there exist three distinct structural types: 
types 1, 2 and 3. Each strain of P. aeruginosa can produce only one of these types, and 
possesses the corresponding type-specific pyoverdine receptor (Cornelis et al. 1989). 
Moreover, considerable variation has been reported within each structural type (Smith et al. 
2005; Bodilis et al. 2009). 
Smith et al. (2005) proposed an explanation of how selection could cause diversity at the 
pyoverdine receptor locus: they argue that siderophore diversity could be a defence against 
exploitation by nonsiderophore-producing bacteria. If there are many non-siderophore 
producers, it would be beneﬁcial for a mutant to produce a siderophore that is distinct in 
structure and then incompatible with the dominant population, which would create 
diversifying selection on the pyoverdine gene (Smith et al. 2005; Tummler & Cornelis 2005). 
However, this explanation assumes that non-siderophore-producing strains are sufﬁciently 
abundant to drive this selection. 
The ecology and epidemiology of P. aeruginosa are not known in great detail, but although 
there are reports of pyoverdine-negative mutants, these are normally considered to be 
exceptions. Indeed, such negative strains readily appear in vitro, when cultures are kept for 
sufficiently long time (Harrison & Buckling 2009). Pyoverdinenegative strains have been 
reported in cystic ﬁbrosis sufferers, but they appear normally after a patient has been 
infected with a pyoverdine positive clone (De Vos et al. 2001). Although coinfection of P. 
aeruginosa has been reported (McCallum et al. 2001) this suggests that infection with 
pyoverdine-negative strains would normally arise through mutation from pyoverdine positive 
strains in the same host. All these observations suggest that the natural abundance of 
pyoverdine-negative strains is low, which raises the question of whether the defence against 
cheating can actually explain the observed pyoverdine diversity. 
Siderophores are secreted into the extracellular environment to bind iron and where they 
can be taken up by any organism that has a suitable receptor. Clones of the same strain 
share siderophores between them, but not with other strains. Hence, siderophores can be 
considered as a receptor-speciﬁc public good. Assuming that the production of siderophores 
is costly, this public good system favours pyoverdine-negative mutants. In the context of 
this public good game, not producing pyoverdine is a cheating strategy (De Vos et al. 2001; 
West & Buckling 2003; Harrison & Buckling 2009). 
If a common good can be exploited by cheaters, a feedback may arise that leads to 
signiﬁcant diversity. The reason is that strategies may evolve recognition schemes to 
exclude the cheaters, as already hypothesised by Hamilton (1964). Hamilton also realised 
that such discrimination schemes themselves are vulnerable to new cheaters. A number of 
studies have shown that this can result in a type of RedQueen evolutionary race, in which 
cheaters continually attempt to “crack” the recognition scheme, while the cooperators 
continually devise new schemes to outrun the cheaters. A siderophore’s variable part acts as 
a tag used in recognition (West et al. 2007). The dynamics that govern siderophore 
dynamics could thus be very similar to the Red Queen’s races reported in the studies of 
green beard genes and other tag-based cooperation models (Riolo et al. 2001; Axelrod et al. 
2004; Jansen & van Baalen 2006; Rousset & Roze 2007; Traulsen & Nowak 2007). 
However, as we will see, some aspects of the bacteria metapopulation make that this 
system has a rather different dynamics, leading to alternating periods of random drift and 
episodes of intense selection. The interplay between complex population dynamics and 
selection that favours diversity is even richer than previously thought. The episodic nature of 
selection by cheaters has important consequences for the design of experimental tests of 
the hypothesis that diversity is generated by social dynamics, as we will discuss in some 
detail. 
In the Methods and Results sections we will study the maintenance of siderophore diversity 
using a mathematical model. For those not interested in the mathematical details we will 
attempt to explain our results verbally in the Discussion section. 
 
 
M E T H O D S :  M  O D E L  D E S C R I P T I O N 
The model describes a set of hosts which can be colonised by bacteria. Some strains of 
bacteria can produce a common good in the form of a siderophore, and the production of 
siderophores increases the output of the colony. We assume that there are different strains 
of bacteria, each producing a different type of siderophore and having only the 
corresponding receptor for the siderophores produced: a strain cannot use siderophores 
produced by other strains. The production of siderophores and the expression of the 
receptor are controlled by different but adjacent genes (Merriman et al. 1995; Ghysels et al. 
2004; Smith et al. 2005) (fpvA and pvd respectively in P. aeruginosa). We will consider them 
as a single locus, since a single mutation would obviously be detrimental because of a 
mismatch between the siderophore and its receptor. We also assume that there are 
siderophore-negative strains, which have lost the ability to produce siderophores, but are 
still capable of using the siderophore for which they possess the corresponding receptor. 
Therefore, we characterise a strain by two traits that evolve independently: the strategy 
(cooperation or cheating) and the type of siderophore it produces and/or can use. This 
conveniently captures the functionality of the biology of the system whilst allowing 
mathematical analysis. 
Patches colonised by a strain of cooperators are vulnerable to compatible cheaters, because 
cheaters beneﬁt from the siderophores while not paying any production cost. The 
appearance of compatible cheaters leads to the breakdown of cooperation, as they invade 
and oust the cooperators. Patches colonised by the cheaters are vulnerable to incompatible 
cooperators however, because these cooperators can keep the beneﬁts of siderophores to 
themselves. Finally, because of positive frequency dependence, we assume that a patch 
dominated by one strain of cooperators cannot be invaded by a rare cooperator with a 
different siderophore type. Similarly, cheaters cannot invade patches of different cheaters. 
Assuming local dynamics are fast, the transitions are instantaneous, and patches only 
contain a single strain of bacteria. We will therefore characterise the state of a patch by the 
type of strain that is currently inhabiting it: we denote Ai and Ci the fraction patches that 
contain cooperators of type i and cheaters of type i, respectively. Figure 1 summarises the 
transitions in the states that the model allows. 







Figure 1 Outcomes of the common good game. If a patch is occupied by a cooperator, it is 
vulnerable to invasion by a compatible cheater (with rate φbC). If a patch is occupied by a 
cheater, it is vulnerable to invasion by an incompatible cooperator (with rate bA). In 
principle, the diagonal transitions (Ci <-> Cj and Ai <-> Aj ) are possible too through random 
drift, but this will be such a slow process that it can be ignored. 
Patches are colonised by dispersing bacteria with rates bA and bC for cooperators and 
cheaters respectively. We assume that cooperators are more efﬁcient in exploiting their 
hosts than cheaters (on their own), therefore cooperator patches will produce more 
dispersers, and we have bA  >  bC . We differentiate the invasion by cheaters in an empty 
patch and in a patch already occupied by a compatible cooperator: as cheaters beneﬁt from 
siderophores already produced by compatible cooperators in a cooperator patch, we could 
assume that colonisation of a cooperator patch by compatible cheaters is facilitated by a 
factor φ > 1. For simplicity however, we will assume that cheaters will invade cooperator 
patches as easily as empty patches, so that φ= 1 and will thus not appear in the model (see 
Data S1 for results taking φ >  1 into account). 
Between patches : The metapopulation model 
New strains appear in the metapopulation through mutation. We describe two types of 
mutation affecting the local dynamics: with rate ε, the mutation from siderophore-producing 
to non-siderophore producing strategy leads to the replacement of cooperators by 
compatible cheaters inside a patch, and with rate δ, the mutation of siderophore type leads 
to the replacement of cheaters by incompatible cooperators inside a patch. Since the 
mutation of siderophore type needs a double mutation (on the siderophore and the receptor 
genes), we impose ε > δ. We ignore all the other mutation possibilities, as they are 
irrelevant for the local dynamics: for instance, the mutation from non-siderophore-producing 
strategy to producing would render the mutant (now cooperator) vulnerable to the all-
cheater resident population, and thus it could not invade. Thus, an empty patch can change 
status when it is colonised, a colonised patch can change status either by local extinction, by 
competition from other strains, or as a consequence of the fixation of a mutant. The 
dynamics of a metapopulation with n types of siderophore producers are governed by the 









Here, (1 – ΣA - ΣC)bA Ai represents the colonisation of empty patches by Ai, mAi the 
extinction of Ai patches, bC AiCi the colonisation of Ai patches by Ci, bA Ai (ΣC-Ci ) the 
colonisation of Cj ( j ≠ i) patches by Ai , εAi the conversion from Ai to Ci, δ/n- 1 (ΣC - Ci ) the 
conversion from patches Cj ( j ≠ i) to Ai. Similarly, (1 – ΣA - ΣC) bC Ci represents the 
colonisation of empty patches by Ci , mCi the extinction of Ci patches, bACi (ΣA - Ai) the 
colonisation of Ci patches by Aj (j ≠ i) patches, δCi the conversion from patches Ci to Aj. 
R E S  U L T S 
We will start by assessing under what conditions new types can invade in the population and 
ﬁrst analyse the existence and invasibility of equilibria without explicit mutation, so that ε = 
δ = 0. We first determine the equilibria of the system. Then, we explore under which 
conditions a metapopulation using a single siderophore type can be invaded by a strain 
using a new type of siderophore. 
 
We denote Ā and C the equilibria for the total populations of altruists and cheaters, 
respectively. We will only consider the simultaneous non-zero equilibrium for both strategies 








As Ā and C are proportions, feasible equilibria constrain between 0 and 1. For a 
metapopulation with only one type of siderophore produced (n = 1), a feasible equilibrium 
can exist, with co-operators and cheaters present. If we increase the number of siderophore 
types (n ≥ 2) however, there is no solution with 0 <C < 1 anymore: the cheaters cannot 
stably persist in the metapopulation if there is more than one siderophore type (Fig. 2). 
The fact that no diverse equilibrium is possible raises the question what will happen in the 









 Figure 2 How cheaters disappear from patches when there is more than one type of 
siderophore. First both Ai and Ci are going to equilibria Ā and C. The appearance of a 
competitor (Aj ) drives the population of Ci to extinction and Aj settles in an all-cooperator 
system (neutrally stable). Parameters : bA = 3, bC = 1.2, M = 1. 
Even if cheaters cannot persist in a diverse metapopulation this does not mean they do not 
play a role in determining siderophore diversity. In order to gain an intuitive understanding 
of their role, we now investigate the invasion by mutant types using a novel siderophore 
into a system which has a resident cooperator and cheater who share a single siderophore 
(n = 1). We consider first what happens if a mutant cheater appears in the metapopulation. 
This mutant cheater has no advantage because it cannot use the siderophores produced by 
the resident cooperator, and therefore, it cannot invade (see Data S2 for a mathematical 
description). 
Invasibility 
Then, we consider what happens if a mutant cooperator that uses a new type of 
siderophore arises in a population. This mutant is initially not encumbered by any cheaters, 
so it has an advantage over the resident cooperator which is being exploited by its cheater, 
and will invade the system. When this mutant invades, the resident co-operator will 
decrease in density. Eventually, the resident density will drop below a threshold density, 
denoted AT, which is the density value above which a cooperator can support the presence 
of a corresponding cheater (see Data S3 for a mathematical derivation). As a result, the 
resident cheater decreases and once it has gone extinct, the two strains of cooperators will 
coexist in a neutral equilibrium (Fig. 3). However, a cheater can reappear whenever one 
particular corresponding strain of cooperators exceeds the AT threshold, triggering the same 
mechanism to regulate the cooperators, protecting the emerged diversity. Thus, although 
they cannot persist in the metapopulation, cheaters have an ephemeral but important role in 
regulating siderophore diversity. The overall effect will depend on the level of the threshold 
density AT, the processes (such as drift) that allow some cooperator strains to exceed this 
threshold, and the processes (such as mutations) that reintroduce cheaters into the 







Figure 3 The role of the cheaters. Cheaters can appear in the population if one of the 
cooperating strains exceeds a threshold density AT. The cheater of the abundant cooperator 
increases and regulates its population, then disappears again. The amplitude between high 
and low cooperators is reduced, and cheaters cannot reinvade until the same process 
perturbs the relative frequencies of the cooperators. Parameters : bA = 5, bC = 3, M = 1. 
Mutations have a number of important effects. The ﬁrst is that it may lead to genetic drift, 
which has the potential to favour (at random) one of the cooperator strains. The second is 
the occasional appearance of cheater mutants which, as we have seen, protects diversity. 
The diversity in such a system thus depends on a balance between generation of new types 
through mutation, loss through drift but also regulation by cheaters. To study the dynamics 
of this diversity, we used a simulation model. This simulation model is a stochastic version of 
the deterministic metapopulation model, in which the number of patches is ﬁnite. Otherwise, 
the patch state transitions follow the same rules as in the deterministic model (colonisation, 
extinction, competition between strains, mutations), in discrete time. 
Stochastic simulations 
We ﬁrst study the effect of stochasticity in a polymorphic metapopulation of cooperators 
without cheaters. Because all strains of cooperators are competitively neutral with respect to 
each other, demographic stochasticity makes that types eventually disappear. 
Unsurprisingly, in the absence of cheaters, the metapopulation eventually loses all its initial 
diversity and becomes monomorphic (Fig. 4a) because of genetic drift. 
The presence of cheaters in the metapopulation has a protective effect on the population 
diversity: diversity is invariably maintained in all the simulations we carried out (Figs 4b and 
6a,b). This is in stark contrast with the results of our simulations without cheaters and 
shows how cheaters can act as a force against the loss of diversity in siderophore types 
through genetic drift. Moreover, in agreement with our theoretical analysis, while being 
critical to diversity, cheaters remain at very low frequencies in the population, and increase 
only episodically. Figure 5 shows clearly the mechanism maintaining diversity: through 
genetic drift, one type is starting to increase in frequency, reducing the frequency of the 
other type present. At some point, when the frequency of this cooperator crosses the 
threshold AT, we observe some time later a short appearance of the corresponding cheater, 
reducing the frequency of the cooperator below AT, before disappearing again. The genetic 
drift is thus counteracted by the cheaters, which act as a regulating force which is absent 
most of the time but appears when one of the cooperating strains becomes dominant (i.e. 
crosses the threshold), thus protecting diversity. 
Figure 5 demonstrates how diversity is promoted and maintained by cheaters in the 
metapopulation. But it leaves unanswered the question as to whether this diversity is 
bounded, and if so, to what level it is regulated. Figure 6a,b shows the effect of mutation 
rates on the resulting level of diversity. High mutation rates of the cooperating to cheating 
strategy (ε) lead to high diversity in the metapopulation (Fig. 6a). This is because the 
cheating strains appear quicker in the population, preventing the disappearance of types 
through the genetic drift: if a strain of cooperator increases in frequency, it is regulated 
when the corresponding cheaters appear (Fig. 5), but the delay between the increase of 
cooperators and the appearance of the corresponding cheaters can lead to the extinction of 
other less abundant types. The level of diversity also depends on the rate of appearance of 
new siderophore types δ. If the new strains appear quickly, diversity will be high, and on the 















Figure 4 Stochastic simulations for an initially diverse system of three different cooperators. 
Graphs show the cumulative densities of cooperators: A1 in green, A2 in blue, A3 in red. (a) 
Dynamics in absence of cheating strains. Over time, some strains disappear (A1 and A2) and 
eventually the system reverse to a monomorphic population. (b) Dynamics in presence of 
cheating strains. Strains vary in densities, but do not disappear even for a longer period of 
time. Parameters: bA = 5, bC = 3, M =1. 
 Figure 5 Dynamics for a two-type system. In blue, cooperator and cheater 1, and in red, 
cooperator and cheater 2. The upper ﬂuctuating lines correspond to the densities of 
cooperators, and the lines below consisting of isolated peaks to the densities of cheaters. 
When one of the cooperating strains increases in frequency, the other decreases. If one of 
the cooperators goes above the threshold AT (black horizontal line), the corresponding 
cheating strain invades, which regulates the cooperators, and then disappears. Parameters: 
bA = 5, bC = 3, M = 1, N = 5000 
D I S C U S S I O N 
We used a mathematical model to investigate how siderophore diversity can be maintained 
in populations of siderophore-producing bacteria. We found that cheaters can play a crucial 
role in the maintenance and regulation of siderophore diversity. Because siderophore-
negative cheaters can act as a regulating agent, the cheating strains increase in density if 
the speciﬁc siderophore they can use is produced in sufﬁcient abundance, which results in a 
decrease of the cooperators that produce this siderophore. The cheaters then disappear. 
This frequency-dependent mechanism selects against all siderophore-producing strains that 
becomes sufﬁciently dominant. Our analysis suggests that this mechanism favours diversity 
even if the cheaters occur infrequently in the metapopulation and at a very low density. 
Our results thus support the hypothesis that siderophore diversity results from cheating, as  
suggested by Smith et al. (2005). However, this hypothesis appears to rely on the selection 
pressure caused by cheaters, which often seem to be absent. Although cheating strains arise 
readily in laboratory experiments (Harrison & Buckling 2009), they seem rare in natural 
populations (West & Buckling 2003). Is it then possible that siderophore diversity has 
nevertheless arisen as an evolutionary response to non-siderophore-producing strains? Our 
model shows that this can indeed be the case: ﬂuctuations from drift in the relative densities 
of siderophore can make certain strains temporarily abundant. If this happens, non-
siderophore-producing strains will be selected for and rapidly increase, and will reduce the 
density of these abundant strains, increasing the densities of other siderophore producers in 
the process. This mechanism prevents producing strains from reaching very high or very low 
densities and thus maintains diversity through episodic outbreaks of non-siderophore-
producing strains. 
Siderophore diversity is not regulated as a dynamic equilibrium, in which the forces that 
increase and decrease the diversity counteract each other and balance out, but as a 
dynamic process in which the drift in the population keeps changing the densities of the 
different siderophore-producing strains in the population. Only once a strain crosses the 
threshold do the cheating strains emerge and does the regulation kick in. This implies that 
stochastic processes play a key role: they govern both the drift in a strain’s frequency and 
the appearance of new mutants. The dynamics are thus characterised by an alternation of 
periods of steady genetic drift with episodes of rapid and intense evolution. 
This is also found in other tag-based cooperation models (Riolo et al. 2001; Axelrod et al. 
2004; Jansen & van Baalen 2006; Rousset & Roze 2007) in which diversity results from non-
equilibrium dynamics. If there were no incentives to cheat it would pay all cooperators to 
produce the same type of siderophore, that is to equally share the beneﬁts of their altruistic 
acts. Only when there are cheaters around it pays for cooperators to deviate from the 
dominant type and share beneﬁts with members using the same receptor. This results in 
(locally) unstable dynamics governed by rarity advantage and commonness penalty. In 
Jansen & van Baalen’s (2006) beard chromodynamics model different types occur in 
amorphous clusters, leading to a dominance of cheaters. In the model presented here types 
appear in homogeneous clusters, leading to dynamics in which altruists prevail. Whether a 
similar relationship between siderophore production costs and tag diversity exists as in the 
Jansen & van Baalen (2006) model remains to be tested. 
In our model, the ﬁnal levels of siderophore diversity depend on the mutation rates. 
Moderate diversity can evolve when mutation rates are low, but high mutation rates lead to 
a high diversity. This result is consistent with the discovery of hypermutant strains of P. 
aeruginosa, which have unusually high mutation rates (Oliver et al. 2000; Buckling et al. 
2007), particularly for the mutS gene, involved in the DNA- mismatch repair mechanism 
(Oliver et al. 2002). As in the classical Red Queen, the mutation rate has the general effect 
of speeding up the dynamics: cooperative strains can escape their corresponding cheaters 
quicker, by producing new types of siderophores, and vice versa, the cheating strains can 













Figure 6 The effect of mutations on diversity. Simulations start with an initial monomorphic 
metapopulation. (a) The effect of the cooperation to cheat strategy mutation rate (ε) on the 
diversity. Diversity is higher if the rate e is high. Parameters : N = 10 000, δ = 0.1ε. (b) The 
effect of the type-mutation (δ) rate on diversity. Diversity decreases and is low when the 
ratio ε/δ is high. Parameters: N = 10 000, e = 0.01. 
Our results show that the diversity in the siderophore receptor locus can result from the 
selection imposed by the episodic presence of cheating strains. This ﬁnding has relevance 
beyond explaining siderophore diversity: a number of other organisms have been suggested 
as having tag-based recognition, for instance Saccharomyces cerevisiae has genes (FLO) 
that cause flocculation which is associated with social behaviour (Smukalla et al. 2008). It 
has also been suggested that there is considerable diversity in these genes, with closely 
related strains of S. cerevisiae often displaying very distinct phenotypes, because of an 
unstable tandem repeat sequence in the FLO1 gene (Verstrepen et al. 2004, 2005; Smukalla 
et al. 2008). Moreover, mutation rates of the FLO1 gene have been found to be at least 
100-fold greater than the average mutation rates in the genome, suggesting that the same 
mechanism, as the one we highlight here, is operating in this system. We thus suggest that 
diversity in the FLO 
genes could also have emerged as an evolutionary response to the presence of cheaters. A 
further example are side-blotched lizards where the males form cooperative mate-guarding 
dyads based on throat colouration (Sinervo & Clobert 2003; Sinervo et al. 2006). Different 
throat colours have been observed together with the unstable dynamics in which altruistic 
and selﬁsh traits alternate in dominance. 
Our results suggest that to better understand diversity in siderophores, or tag-based 
cooperation in general, one needs to go beyond studying strains in isolation or even 
snapshots from a population. One needs to investigate the change in tag composition over 
sufﬁcient time within such populations, and in sufﬁcient detail. Our analysis suggests that 
siderophore producers, such as P. aeruginosa, can serve as an experimental model system 
to demonstrate how altruistic behaviour can go together with the dynamically unstable 
behaviour known as chromodynamics. 
The experiment is simple in essence: create a metapopulation of bacteria and allow some 
movement between the patches. What we predict is that the diversity in siderophores is 
more persistent if cheating strains are occasionally introduced in this population. A further 
prediction is that the densities of cheaters will be negatively correlated to the siderophore 
diversity. 
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